Adoptive Child and Probate

Probate Code §6451 provides that

(a) An adoption severs the relationship of parent and child between an adopted person and a natural parent of the adopted person unless both of the following requirements are satisfied:

(1) The natural parent and the adopted person lived together at any time as parent and child, or the natural parent was married to or cohabiting with the other natural parent at the time the person was conceived and died before the person’s birth.

(2) The adoption was by the spouse of either of the natural parents or after the death of either of the natural parents.

In the case of inheritance, adoption can play the deciding factor if an individual inherits from an estate or not. A recent unpublished appellate decision was centered on the adoption of a decedent in 1923 and the inheritance rights of a niece.

"Decedent was born in Florida in September 1923. His mother died when he was about eight days old. Around November 1923, Decedent was adopted by J.B. Morrow and Edna Morrow.  Decedent died intestate in California in 2017. He was survived by his spouse who subsequently passed away in 2020. In 2021, Respondent Debbra Tauber was appointed administrator of Decedent's estate."

"In 2023, Pitts filed a petition to determine her entitlement to a share of Decedent's estate (§ 11700). She argued she was entitled to inherit from Decedent because she was his biological niece, the daughter of his biological sister.  Tauber filed an objection to the petition. According to Tauber, Pitts was not an intestate heir entitled to distribution because Decedent had been adopted. Tauber noted adoption severs a parent-child relationship pursuant to section 6451, subdivision (a)." 

"As noted ante, to inherit through a natural parent, Pitts must satisfy section 6451, subdivision (a), which includes the requirement that Decedent and his natural parent "lived together at any time as parent and child." (§ 6451, subd. (a)(1).) The trial court did not err by finding insufficient evidence to establish Decedent and his natural parent lived together at any time as parent and child. Pitts relies on circumstantial evidence—i.e., records showing a shared residence and inference that Decedent was born at home—to show Decedent and his mother must have lived together. But the inference is speculative. Decedent's mother died eight days after his birth, and he was adopted when he was about two months old. At most, Pitts' documents establish the mother resided at the listed address. They do not establish Decedent and the mother lived together as parent and child within the meaning of section 6451, subdivision (a)(1). Nor does the brief period (eight days) compel such a finding as a matter of law. On this record, the court could reasonably conclude Pitts did not meet her burden."

Estate of Morrow, Orange County Superior Court case no. 30-2020-01172277 

Malicious Prosecution of a Probate Action

Usually when a party loses a case, they do not compound their loss by continuing to litigate. In other words, "if you find yourself in a hole, stop digging." Alas one litigant in a recent unpublished appellate option did not heed this adage.

"This case stems from a family dispute over the probate of the estate of Mohammed Hussain (decedent). After decedent passed away, one of his sons, Asif "Robert" Hussain (Asif) took a document purporting to be decedent's will and instructed one of his friends to sign and backdate the witness attestation clause so he could probate the will. The will named Asif the executor of decedent's estate and distributed most of the estate to Asif. Decedent's other heirs contested Asif's petition to probate the will. Asif subsequently conceded that the will was invalid and abandoned his probate petition.  

Decedent's other heirs then filed suit against Asif for malicious prosecution of the probate action. In response, Asif filed a special motion to strike the malicious prosecution claim under our anti-SLAPP statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.) The trial court denied the motion. Asif now appeals, arguing the plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient evidence that he acted without probable cause and with malice in filing the probate petition. We disagree and affirm the trial court's ruling." 

The declaration submitted by the aggrieved litigant:

"Asif submitted a declaration in support of his motion attesting to the following facts. In 2022, decedent told Asif that he intended to distribute his home in Granada Hills to Asif and Seletskiy, with 60 percent going to Asif and the remainder to Seletskiy. Decedent also indicated that he prepared a will and instructed Asif to sign it. In December 2022, decedent gave Asif the combination to a safe and told him to retrieve the documents stored there in the event of his death. After decedent's passing, Asif opened the safe and retrieved a will. He then took that will to a non-attorney "probate specialist," Cheryl Templeton (Templeton). Templeton told him that "in order to submit the [w]ill to [p]robate it needed to be fully signed and dated by two witnesses who knew [decedent]."  

Having been told that the will was defective because it was not signed by two witnesses, Asif concluded that "all [he] needed to do to submit the [w]ill to [p]robate was to get another signature on the [w]ill from a person who knew [decedent]." He went to Gorgone and asked her to sign the witness attestation clause and backdate her signature to July 2022. He then took the signed will to a probate attorney and directed his new counsel to file the probate petition. At some unspecified time after filing the petition, Asif "became aware" that Gorgone's signature was invalid because she did not witness decedent sign the will as she had attested to. Once he learned this information, he instructed his counsel to dismiss the probate petition. Asif claims he did not intend to deceive any of the plaintiffs and would not have submitted the will to probate court if he had known that Gorgone's signature was defective."

Hussain et al. v. Hussain et al., Los Angeles County Superior Court case no. 24VECV04712.

Influence or Undue Influence?

One method to invalidate a revocable transfer on death deed (TOD) is by proving undue influence. Obviously the beneficiary of a TOD will have some influence over the drafter of the TOD. For example, in the case of a child and parent, the child may converse with the parent, care for the parent, buy groceries for the parent, pay bills for the parent, take the dog out for a walk, etc. These interactions between the child and parent certainly give the child influence with the parent. Still, the threshold question is whether the influence is undue or not. If undue influence, the free will of the parent is overcome by the influence of the child. 

A recent unpublished appellate decision articulated the difference between "influence" and "undue influence."

"I find that Ms. Vosburgh influenced Ms. Fries, gave her information regarding, perhaps, Mr. Gribbon's misdeeds from the past; gave Ms. Fries information about the check writing that, again, and I'm not taking this for the truth, but this is information that Ms. Fries received, whether she believed it or not or whether it is true or not, that is not for me to determine, but this is the information she had.      

And I do believe that Ms. Vosburgh informed Ms. Fries of the check writing, that it was Mr. Gribbon who wrote himself checks; that it was Mr. Gribbon who — I'm trying to choose my words regarding the bird. I know there was some argument whether it was stolen, sold, boarded, all of those things, but taken away from Ms. Fries, and she was not happy about that. She did not consent to that.      

And, also, regarding her apartment being emptied when she came home, again, I'm not accepting those as, necessarily, the truth, but . . . that [information] was otherwise provided to Ms. Fries.      

And based on [that] information, and I even thought about this, essentially, whether they be true, whether they be disinformation, misinformation, it was information that she had, and the question is, having [that] information, whether it be true or not, whether it be mis-, dis-, or lies, when she had [the] information, was she of her free mind, her own volition? Did she voluntarily, knowingly, intelligently make a decision to, nonetheless, give both properties to Ms. Vosburgh? And based on the evidence that I have, that Ms. Fries was actually upset with Mr. Gribbon, whether it be the bird, whether it be because of the checks, the emptied out apartment, that she was upset with Mr. Gribbon, she did not want to communicate with Mr. Gribbon, she did not want to — I think one of the . . . statements that was given was she did not want anything to do with Mr. Gribbon, again, whether that be based on truth, misinformation, that's how she felt.      

And based on the feeling, based on the belief, then she did execute a transfer of that deed on her own free will, voluntarily, intelligently, informed, or without duress or coercion, and I do believe that it was. So based on those, I do feel that the Petitioner, Mr. Gribbon, has failed to meet his burden to show that Ms. Fries otherwise executed the [TODs] September 2nd, 2019, that she was under undue influence.      

I believe she was influenced, but whether it was "undue," I do not find that it was."

Gribbon v. Vosburgh, Riverside County Superior Court case no. PRRI2100639; PRRI2200180 

Signing a Will

In order to be validly executed, a will needs to be signed by the testator, by some other person in the testator’s presence and by the testator’s direction or the testator's conservator pursuant to a court order. Probate Code §6110(b). Typically the signatory on the will is that of the testator. In a will contest, the genuineness of the testator's signature can occasionally be at issue. A recent unpublished appellate decision touched upon the testator's alleged execution of her will.

"After decedent Diane Carreira died on August 26, 2022, appellant Emily Mendoza petitioned to admit to probate a document entitled "Power of Attorney and Last Will and Testament of Diane Carreira," dated August 23, 2022. The probate court determined that the will was not valid because Carreira had not signed it. The court found in the alternative that, even if Carreira had properly executed the document, it was still invalid under the conclusive presumption of fraud or undue influence that applies when the drafter of a will is also a beneficiary." 

Typically a handwriting expert is retained to opine as to whether or not the testator in fact signed the will. This case was no different.

"Mendoza testified that she drafted the will during a phone call with Carreira on the Monday before Carreira died. Carreira "pretty much" told her what to put in the will, although Mendoza "added details," including names and terminology. Mendoza testified that she took the document to Carreira, who signed it while inclined in bed. Mendoza said she was familiar with Carreira's signature and recognized the signature on the will as being hers." 

"Substantial evidence supports the probate court's finding that Carreira did not sign the will that Mendoza proffered. Lilinoe-Davis's expert witness testified that Carreira's signature was not genuine based on several characteristics distinguishing the signature on the will from other known exemplars of Carreira's signature. These distinguishing characteristics were not explained by Carreira's illness or the fact that she purportedly signed the will in bed. Lilinoe-Davis also provided her own lay opinion that the signature on the will did not resemble Carreira's signature. The testimony of these two witnesses provided substantial evidence that the signature was not genuine. Mendoza emphasizes her own testimony that she saw Carreira sign the will, but it was within the probate court's purview to weigh the conflicting evidence. (Estate of Clark (1949) 93 Cal.App.2d 110, 119 [handwriting expert testimony provided substantial evidence to reject will, despite contrary testimony of other witnesses]; Estate of Kisling (1945) 68 Cal.App.2d 163, 166-167 [handwriting expert testimony and court's own examination of signature were substantial evidence to overcome contrary testimony of two witnesses].)"

Estate of Diane Carreira, Siskiyou County Superior Court case no. SCCV-CVPB-2022-973 

Omitted Spouse

The marital status of a person occasionally changes over time. For example, a person could be married one year, divorced the next year and then re-marry the following year. With the change in marital status, there are estate planning implications that may arise. One such issue is the beneficial interest, if any, of a subsequent spouse in the other spouse's estate. The relevant law provides that "if a decedent fails to provide in a testamentary instrument for the decedent’s surviving spouse who married the decedent after the execution of all of the decedent’s testamentary instruments, the omitted spouse shall receive a share in the decedent’s estate" per CA law. Probate Code §21610. However, a surviving spouse does not automatically qualify as an omitted spouse.    

A recent unpublished appellate opinion centered on a surviving spouse's claim to be an omitted spouse.

Oswaldo Herrador, a widower, married Rose Herrador in 2015. Oswaldo had executed a marital trust with his prior spouse, Gloria Herrador, in 2010. The trust was funded with a fourplex in Daly City, CA and a residence in San Bruno, CA. Gloria passed away in 2010 and Oswaldo passed away in 2022. In 2023, Rose filed a petition requesting her share of Oswaldo’s estate as an omitted spouse. The petition alleged that Oswaldo “neglected to create and execute either a Trust or a Will to provide for Rose. Oswaldo also failed to provide for Rose otherwise, commensurate with her spousal share," by naming her as beneficiary "on any account or insurance policy, or granting her an interest in title to either of his two real properties located in San Mateo County."  

Oswaldo’s children filed an objection which “disputed that Rose was an omitted spouse since Oswaldo provided for her in a separate testamentary instrument, his "Last Will and Testament," which governed his assets in El Salvador and was subject to probate in El Salvador (El Salvador Will). It also alleged, inter alia, that Rose was not an omitted spouse because Oswaldo designated her as the sole beneficiary of his Wells Fargo Bank account."

“On April 15, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on the motion for summary adjudication. Afterward, the trial court granted the motion, ruling, Petitioner is not an omitted spouse having been named as a beneficiary under decedent Oswaldo Herrador's testamentary instrument, namely his last will and testament governing his assets in El Salvador, executed after his marriage to Petitioner."

Rose appealed the trial court’s decision and this decision was affirmed on appeal.

Herrador v. Herrador, San Mateo County Superior Court case no. 23-PR0-00365 

Post-Death Business Operations

A successor trustee occasionally is tasked with operating a decedent's business post-death. For example, I've had clients in which the decedent leased rental properties, operated a marketing corporation, operated a painting business, operated a consulting business, etc. The successor trustee has basically three options at their disposal. First, the successor trustee can continue to operate the business. In the case of leasing rental properties, past clients have sometimes taken this approach. Second, the successor trustee can sell the business to a third-party. If the business involves leasing rental properties, selling the business, i.e. selling the underlying real estate, is a common approach. Third, the successor trustee can cease business operations. If the decedent operated a sole proprietorship, past clients have typically ceased business operations because the business was intimately tied to the decedent and had limited market value. Whatever the decision made by the successor trustee, they are required by CA law to act in the best interests of the beneficiaries.   

A recent unpublished appellate decision found that the successor trustee had breached their fiduciary duty by continuing to operate the decedent's business post-death.

"Mark contends the trial court erred in finding he breached the Trust by continuing hard money lending after Howard's death.

Mark argues he had a duty to keep the disputed funds productive. (§ 16007.) But a trustee has a duty to invest trust funds prudently. (Estate of Collins (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 663, 669.) The trial court could reasonably conclude that hard money lending is not appropriate for a fiduciary. Mark even acknowledged that it is a risky business.

Mark claims that section 4.05 of the Trust authorized him to continue his hard money investments, which provides:

"Section 4.05. On any final or partial distribution of the assets of the Trust Estate and on any division of the assets of the Trust Estate into shares or partial shares, the Trustee may distribute or divide such assets in kind, may distribute or divide undivided interests in such assets, or may sell all or any part of such assets and make distribution or division in cash or partly in cash and partly in kind. The decision of the Trustee, either prior to or on any division or distribution of such assets, as to what constitutes a proper division of such assets of the Trust Estate shall be binding on all persons in any manner interested in any trust provided for in this Declaration."

Section 4.05 of the Trust governs distribution of Trust assets. Nothing in the section authorizes Mark to engage in an inappropriately risky enterprise."

Braaten v. Braaten, San Luis Obispo County Superior Court case no. 19PR-0393