Community Property and Standing

When a married couple acquires property during their marriage, there is a presumption that the acquired property is "community property." Family Code §760. This is known as the community presumption. If the acquired property is in fact community property, then each spouse owns a 50% interest in the property. 

If a spouse passes away without a will, the deceased spouse's share of the community property, 50%, passes to the surviving spouse. Probate Code §6401. The surviving spouse thereby owns 100% of the community property following the deceased spouse's passing. 

A recent unpublished appellate opinion focused on the issue of a surviving spouse claiming a community property interest in her late husband's estate.

"Maria Avina's husband, Jesus Enrique Avina, died without a will. Jesus allegedly left behind his property interest in A & A: Grove Service & Produce (A & A), a company he and Maria built together during their marriage. After his death, Maria brought a spousal property petition seeking a determination that her one-half community property interest in A & A belonged to her, and Jesus's one-half interest in A & A passed to her as the surviving spouse.

Two of the couple's children, Marco Antonio Avina and Marcial Avina, objected to Maria's petition. They asserted the property interest identified by Maria in her petition did not exist, and that ownership rights in A & A were the subject of a civil action for declaratory relief they had filed against Maria. The probate court continued resolution of Maria's petition for more than two years awaiting resolution of the civil action and, when the civil action was dismissed, the probate court granted Maria's petition. It found that Marco and Marcial lacked a "probate interest" because Jesus died intestate, and all interests owned by Jesus that are community property passed to Maria as the surviving spouse."

Avina v. Avina, San Diego County Superior Court case # 37-2019-00063638-PR-SP-CTL

The trial court's decision was upheld on appeal.

The crux of the children's argument was that they lacked standing to object to their mother receiving their father's community property interest in the family business. Only the surviving spouse, i.e. the mother, could inherit the deceased spouse's community property in light of Probate Code §6401.

Alternatively stated, assume that the community property was an apple (just go with me). The deceased spouse's separate property, essentially non-community property, was an orange. The children had standing to object to the orange's distribution because the children would inherit a portion of the orange. Probate Code §6402. However, the children could not object to the apple’s distribution because under no circumstance would the children inherit the apple. Probate Code §6401.

One can see the rationale for excluding an individual from litigating an estate matter in which they will not benefit financially regardless of the conclusion. That is, limiting standing to only interested persons promotes judicial efficiency. Otherwise random people could intervene in estate matters for a myriad of reasons and delay the case's resolution.  

 

 

Will Interpretation

A primary purpose of a will is to exactly identify who the testator wants to inherit their estate. If the person does not care, they can simply choose to abstain from writing a will and let the laws of intestate succession govern the disposition of the estate. Consequently, their next of kin, heirs to use legal parlance, would inherit their estate.  

In a recent unpublished appellate opinion, the California Court of Appeal had to determine which individual the testator was referring to in their will.

"The decedent had two "Janets" in his life: (1) a daughter named Janet Benninghoff, who was known as Janet Derickson before she married; and (2) a companion, associate, paramour, or friend of sorts named Janet Whelan. Whelan contends that she is "Janet Derickson [] Whelan." The estate administrator and Benninghoff assert that Benninghoff is."  

"A page entitled "Upon Death" lists five numbered clauses. The first clause bequeaths a piece of real estate to "Janet Derickson nee Whelan." The second gives another property to "Janet Benninghofen." The third provides that "Janet Derickson-Whelan, Linn Derickson Jr and Judy Hughes" will share equally in the profits from several of the decedent's assets; the fifth specifies that upon the death of "Janet Derickson, Whelan [¶] Linn Jr Derickson and Judy Hughes," the aforementioned profit shares become part of a remaining trust. The fourth provides that the equity in trust "other than items 1 and 2" goes to Hughes's three children. A separate page entitled "Put in Living Trust" and the following page list ten assets, including the homes referenced in the first and second clauses of the "Upon Death" document."

The court ultimately held that 

"Whelan prevails. Because she had a romantic relationship of some kind with the decedent, "Janet Derickson [] Whelan" could plausibly refer to her; the two may well have planned to wed at some point in the future. The same cannot be said of Benninghoff, who has no ties to the surname "Whelan." And the will provides for Benninghoff as "Janet Benninghofen" elsewhere. In light of the language used and the circumstances surrounding the will's execution, there is only one reasonable construction. Whelan is "Janet Derickson [] Whelan."

Another excerpt from the opinion shed light on how the family viewed the decedent's lady friend:

"At some point before his separation from Mary Sue, the decedent began a relationship of sorts with appellant Janet Whelan. The precise contours of Whelan's status vis-à-vis the decedent are unclear. The decedent's obituary dubbed her a "special friend." She has described their association as "what politely might be termed an `extramarital illicit relationship' for an extended period." In briefing before the probate court, Mary Sue, Benninghoff, and the administrator used the more colorful designation "paramour." However, in other briefing before the probate court, the administrator opted for more distant language, stating Whelan "was apparently an associate of the [d]ecedent, but the extent of that relationship is unknown."

San Bernardino County Superior Court case # PROPS0900650.

Estate Planning and Divorce

Unfortunately the words "till death do us part" do not hold true with every marriage. Stating the obvious, some marriages end with a dissolution. When it comes to inheritance rights, married, legally separated and divorced have very important legal distinctions.  The below illustrations highlight these nuances.

Assume Hal and Wendy were married in 2000. They purchase a home in San Jose, CA in 2001 and take title as husband and wife as community property. They then have a son named Sam and a daughter named Dana. Wendy dies in 2005 without a will or trust. By virtue of being married to Wendy and the house being community property, Hal inherits Wendy's 50% share of the house. Probate Code § 6401(a). Sam and Dana receive no share of the house.

Now assume that Hal and Wendy legally separate in 2003 but do not divorce. Wendy purchases a Los Gatos condo in 2004 by herself. Again Wendy dies in 2005 without a will or trust. The San Jose home would still pass to Hal because it is community property. However the Los Gatos condo would be split evenly between Hal, Sam and Dana because the asset would be considered Wendy's separate property. Probate Code § 6401(c). The reason being is that an asset acquired after legal separation is considered the separate property of the acquiring spouse. Nonetheless, Hal still has an interest in Wendy's separate property because they were married, though legally separated, when Wendy passed away.

Now assume that Hal and Wendy divorce in 2003 because Wendy  lacked the plow skills that Hal wanted in his bride. The divorce decree awards 50% of the house to Hal and 50% of the house to Wendy. Again Wendy dies in 2005 without a will or trust. In this case Sam and Dana would solely inherit the Los Gatos condo. Since Wendy was not married when she passed away, the Los Gatos condo is Wendy's separate property and passes to her children equally. Probate Code § 6402(a). 
 
Now finally assume that Wendy files for divorce on June 30, 2005. Wendy dies a day later on July 1, 2005. Since there was no date of legal separation, let alone a judgment of dissolution, Hal would inherit all of Wendy's community property and 1/3 of her separate property. The other 2/3 would be split evenly between Sam and Dana. 

Interpretation of a Will

Santa Clara County Superior Court

Words matter. Words in a will matter more you could say. This brings us to the story of a recent unpublished appellate decision regarding the interpretation of a will.  This stemmed from a trial court decision in Santa Clara County Superior Court. Case # PR128527.

The late Ethel Josephine Hinz penned a will entirely in her own handwriting. The holographic will read, in its entirety, as follows:

"I, Ethel Josephine Hinz; aka as E.J. Hinz; declare that this will, is my only and last testament. 

"I, name my son, Lester F. Hinz, Jr., as sole heir and executor to manage estate affairs. 

"In the event of any challenges to said estate, I hereby authorize said Executor to dispense the amount of $1.00, one dollar, to any claimant. 

"I am confident that my son, as Executor, will also subscribe to my wishes, along lines that were discussed previously and privately in the past. A simple cremation, without ceremony is the wish of Ethel J. Hinz."

Since the value of the estate exceeded $10M, there were naturally interested parties in this matter. These parties included Lester's wife and two grandchildren of Ms. Hinz (Lester passed away after his mother). The three of them composed the heirs of Ms. Hinz's estate.

The crux here revolved around the phrase "I, name my son, Lester F. Hinz, Jr., as sole heir and executor to manage estate affairs." The trial court invalidated the will as it found that extrinsic evidence could not resolve the ambiguities regarding the aforementioned phrase. The will was found to be ambiguous because it was not clear if Ms. Hinz intended for Lester to be the sole beneficiary or was acknowledging that Lester was her sole child. Due to extrinsic evidence not yielding a clear answer of what Ms. Hinz meant, the trial court invalidated the will. Therefore, Ms. Hinz's estate passed by intestate succession to her heirs, i.e. Lester's wife and her Ms. Hinz's two grandchildren. However, Lester's wife appealed the decision to the 6th District Court of Appeal. On appeal, the trial court's decision was reversed. 

The majority opinion found that the will was unambiguous, i.e. the only interpretation of the word "heir" as used in the will was "beneficiary." Therefore, the Court of Appeal found the will to be valid and instructed the trial court to award 100% of Ms. Hinz's estate to Lester's wife.          

For reference, if you use a $10M valuation figure, the trial court would've awarded the estate as follows:

1. Lester's wife - $5M
2. Ms. Hinz's grandchild - $2.5M
3. Ms. Hinz's grandchild - $2.5M

Following the appellate court's ruling, the distribution would go

1. Lester's wife - $10M
2. Ms. Hinz's grandchild - $0
3. Ms. Hinz's grandchild - $0

Kind of a big difference.

Granted, Ms. Hinz's grandchild can always appeal this decision to the CA Supreme Court or petition for a re-hearing.

Step-Child Inheritance

If a person passes away without a will, the legal term for this is "intestacy." 

If the decedent's estate was not disposed of by a trust or beneficiary designation(s) such as a pay-on-death account, his or her estate will be distributed to their heirs, i.e. their next of kin. This might include a parent, child, uncle, aunt, cousin, etc. For example, assume Bob was a widower who only had 1 child during his marriage. Bob passes away intestate. His sole heir would be his child. If Bob had 2 children, the 2 children would split the distribution of Bob's estate as heirs.  

Probate Code § 6402 lists the order of priority for a decedent's heirs. It goes from those closely related to the decedent to those less closely related to the decedent. The California legislature presumed that a decedent would prefer to leave their estate to a close relative rather than a remote relative.

A question that occasionally arises is whether a step-child is entitled to inherit from an intestate step-parent. The answer, much like most legal questions, results in the familiar refrain "it depends."

The applicable law is Probate Code § 6454. It states as follows:

For the purpose of determining intestate succession by a person or the person’s issue from or through a foster parent or stepparent, the relationship of parent and child exists between that person and the person’s foster parent or stepparent if both of the following requirements are satisfied:

(a) The relationship began during the person’s minority and continued throughout the joint lifetimes of the person and the person’s foster parent or stepparent.

(b) It is established by clear and convincing evidence that the foster parent or stepparent would have adopted the person but for a legal barrier.

Thus both elements, (a) and (b) of the foregoing statute, need to be satisfied to claim an intestate inheritance as a step-child from a step-parent. If both elements cannot be satisfied the step-child is basically a nobody for purposes of intestate succession and receives nothing.

If a step-child cannot show a colorable claim under Probate Code § 6454, there is an alternate route available. A step-child can assert a claim of equitable adoption. "In order to take as an equitably adopted child from the alleged adoptive parent's intestate estate, the claimant must prove the decedent's intent to adopt by clear and convincing evidence." Estate of Ford (2004) 32 C4th 160, 173.   

Equitable Estoppel

The law does not look favorably upon trickery. This is exemplified by Evidence Code § 623, which states that "whenever a party has, by his own statement or conduct, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true and to act upon such belief, he is not, in any litigation arising out of such statement or conduct, permitted to contradict it." This legal doctrine is known as equitable estoppel.

To prove equitable estoppel, a party needs to show that (1) the party to be estopped must know the facts; (2) the estopped party must intend that his conduct shall be acted upon, or must act in a way that causes the other party to believe that was his intent; (3) the party asserting estoppel must be unaware of the true facts; and (4) he must detrimentally rely on the other party's conduct. Estate of Bonanno (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 7, 22. 

This doctrine was recently raised in an unpublished appellate opinion.

Janene Curtis discovered as an adult that she was the daughter of famous actor Troy Donahue, whose real name was Merle Johnson. Previously, at birth, she had been adopted.

When Mr. Donahue passed away, Ms. Curtis was told by a close friend of Mr. Donahue that the drug Vioxx might have caused Mr. Donahue's death. Ms. Curtis then hired a New York law firm to participate in the class action lawsuit against Merck & Co., the pharmaceutical giant that makes Vioxx. Ms. Curtis was later advised to open a probate in California. Since Ms. Curtis lived in Arizona and probate needed to be filed in California, she asked Eve O'Neill, Mr. Donahue's sister, to open probate in California on her behalf.

Ms. Curtis then negotiated a settlement in the Vioxx case and the estate of Mr. Donahue reaped $190,000. Later it was discovered by Ms. O'Neill's attorney that Ms. Curtis had been adopted at birth. An adoption severs normally severs the parent-child relationship whereby inheritance rights are cut off. Probate Code § 6451. The attorney then filed a petition to have Ms. O'Neill be declared the sole heir of Mr. Donahue's estate and to approve the Vioxx settlement. Naturally Ms. Curtis objected to the petition.

Ultimately, after two appeals, it was determined that Ms. O'Neill was equitably estopped from challenging Ms. Curtis' claim to the assets of the Donahue estate, i.e. the Vioxx settlement.

The California Court of Appeal upheld the trial court's decision that "(1) Ms. O'Neill either actually knew of the legal impediments to Curtis inheriting or that she was culpably negligent for failing to learn those facts; (2) Ms. O'Neill intended Ms. Curtis to act upon O'Neill's assertions that she would prosecute the Vioxx litigation on behalf of Ms. Curtis and then give her all the proceeds; (3) Ms. Curtis was unaware that O'Neill would renege; and (4) Ms. Curtis relied to her detriment on Ms. O'Neill's conduct." 

Change to Intestate Succession Law

California Legislature - Sacramento, CA

If a person does not write a will, they die intestate and his or her estate is distributed to their heir(s). This is known as intestate succession. Of note, the term "heir" is essentially next of kin. For example, the heirs of a widow would be her children, if she had any.

One reason why it is prudent to write a will, is to prevent the application of intestate succession. Adherence to the laws of intestate succession are rather strict. If the heir was loved or loathed by the decedent, this person will inherit their estate. Still, California law was recently amended to prevent the ostensible unfairness of intestate succession in one instance. AB-490 modified the law of intestate succession in case of an absent parent. See Prob C § 6452. This law went into effect on January 1, 2014. What spawned this law was the following case and its unfortunate result.

Estate of Shellenbarger (2008) 169 CA4th 894    

Lesley Shellenbarger was the son of Clifford Shellenbarger and Laura Barnes. Lesley was conceived while Clifford and Laura were married but during Lesley's pregnancy, Clifford left Laura. Lesley died intestate in April 2005. Probate proceedings commenced in Ventura County thereafter.

Since Lesley passed away without a spouse, child, etc., Laura was appointed administrator of Lesley's estate. During the probate proceeding, Lesley filed a petition to determine entitlement to Lesley's estate, arguing that since Clifford had abandoned his son, Clifford should be barred from inheriting from Lesley's estate as an intestate heir. See Prob C § 11700. 

The trial court and later the court of appeal ruled that Clifford's abandonment was not fatal to his claim. Since Clifford was married to Laura at the time of Lesley's birth, Clifford was the natural parent of Lesley. Furthermore, since Clifford's parental rights were not terminated during Lesley's minority, he remained the natural parent and therefore, per the old version of Prob C § 6452, qualified as an intestate heir. This allowed Clifford to receive a portion of Lesley's estate. This despite the fact that Clifford had neither fully paid child support nor seen his son during his 42 years of life.

Still, as consistently stated in various court opinions "the Legislature remains free to reconsider the matter and may choose to change the rules of succession at any time." Estate of Griswold 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 191 (2001). The California Legislature subsequently did take it upon themselves to alter an intestate succession law. Prob C § 6452 was modified such that a parent that basically abandons their child is barred from inheriting from the child as an intestate heir. This modification to Prob C § 6452 would have reversed the outcome in Estate of Shellenbarger because Clifford had abandoned his son Lesley. Thus in a hypothetical world that adhered to the modified version of Prob C § 6452, solely Laura, instead of Laura and Clifford, would inherit from Lesley's estate. 

Personal Representative - Executor, Administrator or Administrator with Will Annexed

Using the appropriate term is important in law. While certain terms are inter-changeable, e.g. president and chief executive, other legal terms are not so flexible. For instance, in the probate context, the person entrusted with administering a decedent's estate, the personal representative, can have multiple labels but each label derives from a particular circumstance.

The term "personal representative" means "executor, administrator, administrator with the will annexed, special administrator, successor personal representative, public administrator acting pursuant to Section 7660, or a person who performs substantially the same function under the law of another jurisdiction governing the person’s status."Prob C § 58(a).

Three common labels in terms of describing a personal representative are (1) executor, (2) administrator and (3) administrator with the will annexed. As mentioned, each of these terms relate to a specific situation that allows the person to serve as the personal representative albeit from different routes.

Executor

The executor is the person named in the will to administer the estate.

When appointed, the executor is provided letters testamentary.

Still, the executor must be appointed by the court in order to serve as the executor. It is not automatic that the executor will be appointed. For example, the proposed executor may have predeceased the decedent, is unable to be located or lacks the competency to handle the rigors of probate.

This is probably the term the general public has the most familiarity with out of the three terms. Furthermore, many people erroneously conflate the term "executor" and "trustee"  though the former relates to a will and the latter relates to a trust. While the roles entail similar duties they are nonetheless mutually exclusive terms.  

Administrator

The administrator is the person who administers the estate when the decedent died intestate, i.e. without a will. 

When appointed, the administrator is provided with letters of administration.

Typically the administrator is the child of the decedent because they are an heir and therefore have priority to be named administrator. From personal experience, a probate case I had last year involved an intestate decedent who was survived by her children. Whereas the daughter was the only child interested in handling her mother's probate, she was appointed administrator.    

Administrator with the Will Annexed

The administrator with the will annexed is the person who administers the estate because no executor was named in the will or the proposed executor(s) decline to act.

When appointed, the administrator is provided with letters of administration with will annexed.

This can be seen as a hybrid of the first two because a will has been written but nobody, for whatever reason, can serve as the executor. Hence, the administrator is selected by who has priority via intestate succession, i.e. next of kin, as in the case of an administrator.  Prob C §§8441, 8461.  
  
Clients

The use of the correct term when describing the personal representative is important because when a client calls with a question about probate, their title can provide quick insight into their situation. For example, if a client says they are the executor, then I immediately know that there is a will. 

Adverse Possession

Rarely in life can you take someone else's property without legal consequence. Adverse possession is an exception to this rule.

While recently listening to the radio in the Bay Area, a local news station mentioned the story of a West Oakland man attempting this. This individual was attempting to gain legal ownership of an ostenisbly abandoned home in West Oakland through adverse possession. The article was misleading in its description of adverse possession as it said:

"Adverse possession is an old law, with roots in California dating back to the Gold Rush, where someone can obtain title to a property without paying for it."

This is a misleading statement. There is no such thing as a free lunch in life.

As described below, the requirements of adverse possession require monetary expense on behalf of the adverse possessor, namely payment of property taxes. If the individual wishes to acquire title to this West Oakland home, they will only do so by paying the property taxes for it for 5 years. Hence, it is a stretch to assert that the individual can obtain title without paying for it.     

The following five elements of adverse possession are:

"(1) Possession must be by actual occupation under such circumstances as to constitute reasonable notice to the owner. 
(2) It must be hostile to the owner's title. 
(3) The holder must claim the property as his own, under either color of title or claim of right. 
(4) Possession must be continuous and uninterrupted for five years.
(5) The holder must pay all the taxes levied and assessed upon the property during the period."

Dimmick v. Dimmick (1962) 58 C2d 417.

In context of wills and trusts, adverse possession can possibly be an issue if real estate is involved.

For instance, assume Danny Decedent owned a farm in Alturas, CA, a remote region in northeast California. Danny was estranged from his entire family who lived mainly in San Francisco. Danny passed away in a tragic hot air balloon accident in 2003. Danny died intestate and did not write a trust. 

Danny's neighbor, Sam Squatter, who was aware of adverse possession, began to occupy the farm immediately thereafter in 2003. Sam knew there was no mortgage on the property, after reviewing real property records, so he thought it was worth the gamble. Whereas if the farm was mortgaged, the bank could possibly accelerate the loan upon Danny's death. Yet since there was no mortgage and loan acceleration was not an issue, Sam thought it was worth a shot. Sam completed the steps necessary to assert an adverse possession claim and then instituted a quiet title action. 

Danny's heirs eventually realized that Danny passed away after doing a Google search. When they realized that Danny passed away and owned real estate, they rushed to claim his estate through intestate succession. However, at that point, it was too late as Sam's quiet title action had concluded and he was awarded ownership of the property.  

Execution of a Witnessed Will

 
When a person executes a witnessed will, certain formalities must be adhered to during the process. The following is a brief overview of the process.

First, the will must be signed by one of the following individuals. Prob C § 6110(b)(1)-(3).

1. By the testator.
2. In the testator’s name by some other person in the testator’s presence and by the testator’s direction.
3. By a conservator pursuant to a court order to make a will under Section 2580.

For reference, the testator is the person who wrote the will and a conservator is somebody who has been court-appointed to oversee the testator because the testator lacks mental capacity. 

Second, the will must be witnessed by at least 2 other witnesses. Prob C § 6110(c). The requirements to be a witness involved a low threshold, "any person generally competent to be a witness may act as a witness to a will." Prob C § 6112(a). 

Frequently the drafting-attorney and an employee will serve as the witnesses. It is highly recommended that the witnesses be disinterested. The reason for this is because of Prob C § 6112(c), which reads in pertinent part "unless there are at least two other subscribing witnesses to the will who are disinterested witnesses, the fact that the will makes a devise to a subscribing witness creates a presumption that the witness procured the devise by duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence." 

For example, if Wilbur was a beneficiary under Theo's will and witnessed it, a rebuttable presumption would arise that Wilbur wrongfully procured this devise. Hence, if Wilbur was to inherit Theo's car, Wilbur would have to prove that there was no wrongdoing on his part for inheriting Theo's car. If Wilbur cannot rebut this presumption, he is entitled to take "such proportion of the devise made to the witness in the will as does not exceed the share of the estate which would be distributed to the witness if the will were not established." Prob C § 6112(d). In other words, Wilbur would be entitled to his share of Theo's estate as an intestate heir, if he qualified.

These 2 witnesses must countersign after witnessing the testator sign or acknowledge their signature in front of them. The relevant statute reads "the will shall be witnessed by being signed, during the testator’s lifetime, by at least two persons each of whom (A) being present at the same time, witnessed either the signing of the will or the testator’s acknowledgment of the signature or of the will and (B) understand that the instrument they sign is the testator’s will." Prob C § 6110(c)(1).

For instance, Thomas types a will one Sunday afternoon and invites his neighbors William and Wendy to serve as witnesses that evening in his kitchen. Thomas just tells them that he needs them to witness a legal document but does not mention that it is a will. Just prior to coming over, Williams decides to make a phone call because he is addicted to his smart phone. Wendy leaves without him and enters Thomas' home to find him in the kitchen. Thinking everything is alright, Thomas signs the will and Wendy signs as a witness. After finishing his phone call, William comes to the kitchen for the first time and signs the will as the second witness. Since William was neither present when Thomas signed his will nor did Thomas acknowledge his signature or will to William upon entering the home, Thomas' will does not comply with the requirements of Prob C § 6110(c) and is arguably invalid.

However, Thomas' will may be found to be valid if "proponent(s) of the will establish by clear and convincing evidence that, at the time the testator signed the will, the testator intended the will to constitute the testator’s will." Prob C § 6110(d). Granted, this is not the ideal method to prove a will but it does provide an avenue for relief should the technical attestation requirements not be met.  

Furthermore, a notary should not notarize the will. While studying to become a notary, my training manual actually said it was okay to notarize a will under certain circumstances. The training manual was and remains wrong on this issue. No competent California attorney will tell a client to have a notary notarize a will because 
(1) it is not required and (2) it is so peculiar such that it will arose suspicion that something dishonest is at play. 
   
Also, California law does not require the initialing of each page for a will. The purpose of this is to prove that the testator has presumably read and approved each page. I have seen some wills have initials on each page. Again, this is not required and personally I find this to be overkill. 

Slayer Statutes

The topic of morality is often brought up in how it interacts with the law. Issues such as same-sex marriage, abortion, capital punishment and even taxation all have some hint of morality embedded in them. All these hot-button issues typically invoke a visceral response from most people. Still there are some issues which are almost universally regarded as immoral.  For example, I would assume, if not expect, all would agree with the sentiments of California Civil Code § 3517, which states "No one can take advantage of his own wrong."

The Probate Code has a similar statute, in that it punishes those who commit an immoral act, namely the feloniously killing of another human being. This is known as California's slayer statute. It should be noted that the killing of another must be considered a felonious act. In other words, if you kill somebody in self-defense, justifiable homicide, this would not be considered a felonious killing. Conversely, if you murdered somebody, this would be considered a felonious killing. 

Prob C § 250 

(a) A person who feloniously and intentionally kills the decedent is not entitled to any of the following:

(1) Any property, interest, or benefit under a will of the decedent, or a trust created by or for the benefit of the decedent or in which the decedent has an interest, including any general or special power of appointment conferred by the will or trust on the killer and any nomination of the killer as executor, trustee, guardian, or conservator or custodian made by the will or trust.

(2) Any property of the decedent by intestate succession.

I can reasonably assume that the state of Illinois has a similar slayer statute. I bring this up because of the interesting case of Urooj Khan.

Mr. Khan was the holder of a winning lottery ticket worth $425,000. A few days before he was to collect his lottery prize, Mr. Khan died of presumably natural causes. However, an unnamed relative came forward to ask for a closer inquiry. A toxicology report revealed that Mr. Khad's blood contained lethal amounts of cyanide. The natural conclusion was that Mr. Khan had been poisoned and his death was re-classified as a homicide. At this point, nobody has been charged with a crime.